In order to investigate the phenomenon of just-in-time inventions and its effects, we postulate following hypotheses:
(H1) There is an increased intensity in essential patent filing just before and during a standardization meeting.
(H2) Patents applied for just before or during a standardization meeting have an increased likelihood to become essential patents.
(H3) Standard essential patents applied for just before or during a standardization meeting have a lower technical quality than comparable patents.
In addition to the above hypotheses, we find which firms are enjoying the 'just-in-time inventions' in the standardization meetings by grouping the firms by their business models and their experience in the past 'essential patent game'.
978-1-4799-3735-6/13/$31.00 ©2013 IEEE To test our hypotheses on just-in-time inventions, we collected data on the two largest standards for 3G and 4G mobile telecommunications, known the W-CDMA and LTE standards. With over a billion users, these are not only very successful standards, but also attractive in terms of the availability and the nature of research data. We collected data on all 77 meetings of the most important standardization group for this technology, the 3GPP RAN1 group. These meetings range from 1999 to 2010. We identified the 939 individual participants attending these meetings, and the over 14,000 patents these individuals have applied for as an inventor. We also retrieved all patents that were disclosed as being essential to these two standards, using the OEIDD, Open Essential IPR Disclosure Database (Bekkers et al., 2012) . All patents were matched with PATSTAT, the patent database developed by EPO and OECD, providing detailed metadata on patent families, citations, and other things. We complemented this with additional data from other sources, including the patent owner's business models and its home region. The paper presents a set of four central hypotheses regarding just-in-time innovation, and tests these hypotheses using a mix of methodologies, including logistic regressions.
The main findings of this study can be summarized as follows. Firstly, we do observe that essential patents have a very cyclic filing pattern, strongly related to the occurrence of the 77 standardisation meetings we consider. We model the standardization meeting as a cyclic pattern of three phases, pre-meeting period, meeting, and idle, and test whether or not there is a cyclic pattern in patent filings. Counting the number of patent applications by the meeting participants per week for 12 years, we observe a large peak in patent filings by the meeting participants, especially in the in the 7 days preceding a standardization meeting. Meanwhile, patent filings by non-meeting participants show a small peak for those filed during the standard meetings. Second, we find that this particular set of patents has a much higher likelihood to become essential patents than otherwise comparable patents, an effect that remains remarkably stable after controlling for other possible explanations from a regression analysis. However, patents applied during a standardization meeting do not have such increased likelihood. Thirdly, we find that the essential patents we consider have a higher forward citation score than otherwise comparable patents; a result consistent with earlier work by Rysman & Simcoe (2008) . In addition, however, we observe that essential patents filed by participants in the period 7 days before a standardization meeting have a significantly lower forward citation score than essential patents filed at any other moment in time. The same is true for essential patents filed during a standardization meeting. In contrast, essential patents filed by other inventors, i.e. non-participants, have almost constant forward citation score in any phase. This suggests that just-in-time patents have a significantly lower merit to the standard than other essential patents. Fourth, we conclude that phenomenon of just-in-time inventions is highly concentrated among specific types of firms, above all vertically integrated companies, and the incumbent champions of the previous technology standard.
Based on the findings, we summarize the contributions of this study as follows. First, this study proves the phenomenon of just-in-time inventions from patenting behavior. Despite several concerns raised by the insiders, there have been few clues to back up. This study provides evidence to verify the concerns. Second, this study provides why just-in-time inventions are not favorable. Just-in-time inventions are more likely declared essential than other inventions. Although essential patents have more technical values than non-essential patents, just-intime (essential) patents have lower technical values than other essential patents. The inclusion of such patents must be prohibited to not increase social costs when implementing the standard. Third, it is found that there are two different types of just-in-time inventions. Firms that send participants to meetings file (preliminary) patent applications just before a standardization meeting is held and then go to the meeting trying to get their proposals included in the standard. On the other hand, firms that do not send participants to meetings file new (preliminary) patent applications by combining the proposals and ideas of others at the meetings after learning such ideas.
We believe our findings have a number of implications. First of all, if you believe that standards should only cover patented technology if that technology actually brings technical merit to the standard, then our observed just-in-time patenting behavior should raise concerns. As explained above, we observe that both types of just-in-time patents have a significantly lower technical merit than other essential patents. The inclusion of such patents may result in a range of effects that are relevant to policy makers, competition authorities, standards implementers and end users alike. It may result in higher prices (when the rents are passed on to end users), higher barriers to entry for implementers that do not own patents themselves, and affect the level of competition in the market. It may increase risks such as non-availability of essential patents. Finally, a wider proliferation of essential patents can also increase the risk of patent hold-up: The situation where once the patent is covered by the standard, and implements are locked in, the patent holder charges a higher licensing fee than it could have bargained before the technology was made part of the standard (e.g. ex ante). In such a situation, the patent holder not only charges rent for the technical merit of the patent, it also appropriates itself the (high) switching costs of the implementers. Patent hold-up can overcompensate patentees, raise prices for consumers who lose the benefit of competition among technologies, and deter innovation by manufacturers facing the risk of hold-up (FTC, 2011) .
